Life in the USA-432-The Idea of Genius from Kant to Hegel

From Kant to Schelling and then to Hegel, the understanding of art and beauty
has experienced significant change, and so is the idea of the artist, or the
genius, a term that all three thinkers apply. In Kant’s philosophy of aesthetic
judgment, the understanding of art is predicated on a subjective basis, meaning
that the aesthetic pleasure and pain are derived from the subjective judgment of
the representation of art rather than the work of art itself. However, Kant
attaches special importance to the beauty of nature; in his own words, “art can
only be called beautiful if we are conscious of it as art while yet it looks
like nature” (Kant 314). Because of his emphasis on nature, Kant’s artist is
contrarily the natural and thereby objective genius that comes from nature and
is “manipulated” by nature to convey natural rules. In Schelling’s system, the
understanding of art begins to take on an objective aspect. To Schelling, a work
of art “can be considered successful when it represents the transcendental
beauty of the idea” (Hammermeister 79). That is to say, beginning with
philosophy of nature, Schelling views real art as the objective manifestation of
the idea of nature. Accordingly, this half-subjective and half-objective view of
art entails that Schelling’s artist is also the intermediate genius, meaning
that there are two forces, that of the conscious and that of the unconscious, at
work in them. Finally, by the time Hegel comes up with his philosophy of art,
the understanding of art is taken even further to the objective side; in other
words, Hegel views fine art as the sensual manifestation of the spirit. At the
mean time, “since the work of art springs from the spirit, it needs a subjective
productive activity as its cause . . . [this] activity is the imagination of the
artist” (Hegel 280). Thus, Hegel’s artist is the most unnatural and thereby
subjective genius that is fully conscious of his works. Through a study of the
idea of the genius from Kant to Hegel, the gradual change of understanding in
terms of art and artists can be unfolded: while the understanding of art shifts
from the subjective to the objective side, the understanding of the artist
shifts contrarily from the objective (unconscious) to the subjective (conscious)
side, which point could eventually shine some light upon Hegel’s overall
understanding of the spirit.

For Kant, “beautiful art must look like nature, although we are
conscious of it as art”; furthermore, it is only through agreeing with what Kant
refers to as the “rules” that “the product can become what it ought to be” (Kant
314). In “fine” or “beautiful” art, according to Kant, “it shows no trace of the
rule having been before the eyes of the artist and having fettered his mental
powers” (314). That is to say, although art involves rules, the genius, only
from whom the fine and beautiful works of art can be created, should probably be
seen as one who adheres and expands such rules simultaneously “in a seemingly
effortless and unstrained way” (Hammermeister 36). In Kant’s own words, the
genius “is the innate mental disposition through which nature gives the
rule to art” (Kant 314), meaning that Kant’s genius is fully natural as if he is
unconscious of what he does, because all the required elements—talent, rules,
and the like—are given by nature. In sum, although Kant’s philosophy of art is
in fact the philosophy of subjective and aesthetic judgment, Kant’s
artistic genius is the natural, unconscious, and thereby objective type.

Greatly influenced by the romantics, Schelling’s aesthetic thought begins to
take on a subjective aspect, because art eventually depends on the philosopher’s
subjective interpretation. Due to this shift in the understanding of art,
Schelling’s idea of the genius also changes. Like Kant, Schelling also
acknowledges the uniqueness of artists who create great works of art.
Nonetheless, unlike Kant who absolutely attributes the talents of these artists
to nature, Schelling argues that there are essentially two forces at work in the
genius. On the one hand, there is the Kantian, natural, objective, and
unconscious force that plays a fundamental role in artistic creation. On the
other hand, there is also the conscious and subjective force that initiates the
whole artistic process. That is to say, while “the artist certainly decides to
create a specific work and to make plans for it, the execution demands that an
additional force beyond the control of the artist enter into the work”; “it is
precisely the definition of genius . . . that the unconscious element joins the
conscious effort” (Hammermeister 71). In the Schellingian terminology, the
unconscious force is referred to as “poetry” and the conscious effort is
referred to as “art,” which is later picked up by Hegel, who terms fine art
“poetry” and natural existence “prose” (Hegel 163). That is to say, in
Schelling’s opinion, works of art should obviously be objectively appreciated,
which point departs from Kant and moves toward Hegel, yet such appreciation
depends on (the philosopher’s) subjective interpretation, because artistic
geniuses are not necessarily and fully conscious of their creation, which point
remains faithful to Kant. Therefore, if Kant’s genius has absolutely no idea
what he is doing when he creates works of art, then Schelling’s genius at least
knows to some extent about the artistic process; nonetheless, the latter genius
is still unconscious about the crucial elements of art.

Finally, Hegel enters the scene and changes everything. For Hegel, works of
art are the objective and sensual manifestation of the spirit. Together with
religion and philosophy, art is one of the ultimate forms of the Absolute
Spirit. Following his overall understanding of the spirit, Hegel’s view of art
and the genius are different from Kant and Schelling. In terms of art, Hegel
acknowledges the beauty of nature yet argues that “works of art enchant us, not
because they are so natural, but because they have been made so natural”
(Hegel 164). With the emphasis on the making, Hegel shifts his stress of art
from nature as such to art as such, which breaks from both Kant and Schelling.
The difference between Hegel and Kant is self-evident: while Kant basically
equates art with nature, Hegel does not make such a claim. The difference
between Hegel and Schelling on this point is subtler. There is no room for
nature in Hegel’s three-part manifestation of the Absolute Spirit; in fact, as
mentioned earlier, Hegel views nature as such merely as prose. On the other
hand, Schelling’s transcendental philosophy breaks away from the Fichean
ego-philosophy and precisely begins with the philosophy of nature. Therefore,
for Schelling, the real issue is to show how the subject arises from the object
(nature), which point is indeed a departure from Kant yet not the same as Hegel,
who now seems to have made complete break with nature as such.

Accordingly, Hegel’s genius is different from the previous two types.
Although Hegel admits that the talent of the genius seems to be inborn or
nature-given, it by no means follows that the genius has no idea what they are
doing. To Hegel, the genius is the subjective vehicle for the spirit to express
itself, out of necessity, in objective forms, because “it is only when it is
present in its real existence and placed in unity therewith that the Concept is
the Idea” (106). In order to do this, Hegel’s genius has to call in aid
primarily “the watchful circumspection of the intellect” and “the depth of the
heart and its animating feelings,” neither of which is natural, objective, and
unconscious, which leads Hegel to claim that “it is silly to believe that the
genuine artist does not know what he is doing” (283). Thus, Hegel views the art
as the objective and sensual manifestation of the spirit through the rationality
and ability of the genius who is in full grasp of what he is doing.

Through the above analysis of Kant’s, Schelling’s, and Hegel’s understanding
of art as well as the artistic genius, one is able to observe two types of
changes. On the one hand, the understanding of art shifts from the subjective
side to the objective side. On the other hand, the understanding of the artistic
genius shifts from the unconscious side to the conscious side. Specifically,
Kant is at the subjective and unconscious end, Hegel is at the objective and
conscious end, and Schelling is in between. According to this observation, one
might conclude that these two changes coincide with Hegel’s overall
understanding of the spirit’s gradual unfolding through art. On the one hand,
art by itself becomes more objective from Kant to Hegel. On the other hand,
since the spirit is itself the subject, it thus needs subjective mediation—the
artistic genius—which is manifested by the fact that the genius has become more
subjective/conscious from Kant to Hegel. Viewed together, the change of
understanding from Kant to Hegel can be regarded as a revelation on how the
subjective spirit manages to achieve the final and conscious
objectification of itself through art, which point is also explained
historically by Hegel through his division of art into the symbolic art, the
classical art, and the romantic art.

In conclusion, from Kant to Schelling and then to Hegel, the understanding of
both art and artistic geniuses have experienced significant changes. While the
former two thinkers still hold on to the subjective element of art and the
unconscious aspect of the artistic genius, Hegel reaches the point where art is
fully objective and the artistic genius is fully conscious. The whole process of
getting to where Hegel stands, from a Hegelian point of view, is precisely the
demonstration of the spirit’s gradual and necessarily objectification of itself
in art.

Works Cited

Hammermeister, Kai. The German Aesthetic Tradition. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.

Kant, Immanuel. “Selections from Critique of Judgment.” Philosophies of
Art and Beauty: Selected Readings in Aesthetics from Plato to Heidegger. Ed. Albert
Hofstadter and Richard Kuhns. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976.